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Abstract. Motivated by the sequence form formulation of Koller et al. [19], this paper
defines bilinear games, and proposes efficient algorithms for its rank based subclasses. Bi-
linear games are two-player non-cooperative single-shot games with compact polytopal
strategy sets and two payoff matrices (A, B) such that when (x, y) is the played strategy
profile, the payoffs of the players are xTAy and xTBy respectively. We show that bilin-
ear games are very general and capture many interesting classes of games like bimatrix
games, two player Bayesian games, polymatrix games, two-player extensive form games
with perfect recall etc. as special cases, and hence are hard to solve in general.
Existence of a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium for (symmetric) bilinear games follow
directly from the known results. For a given bilinear game, we define its Best Response
Polytopes (BRPs) and characterize the set of Nash equilibria as fully-labeled pairs in the
BRPs.We consider a rank based hierarchy of bilinear games, where rank of a game (A, B)
is defined as rank(A+ B). In this paper, we give polynomial time algorithms to compute
Nash equilibrium for special classes of bilinear games:
– Rank-1 games (i.e., rank(A + B) = 1).
– FPTAS for constant rank games (i.e., rank(A+ B) is constant).
– When rank(A) or rank(B) is constant. This improves the results by Lipton et al. [22]
and Kannan et al. [17], for bimatrix games with low rank matrices.
1 Introduction
In the last decade, there has been much research at the interface of computer science and game
theory (see e.g. [24,26]). One fundamental class of computational problems in game theory is the
computation of solution concepts of finite games. Nash [23] proved that in any finite game there
always exists a steady state, from where no player gains by unilateral deviation. Such a steady state
has since been namedNash equilibrium (NE) and is perhaps the most well-known and well-studied
game-theoretic solution concept. However, computing a Nash equilibrium is nontrivial, and indeed
the recent series of papers [4,7,11] established that the problem is PPAD-complete for finite games
in the standard normal form representation, even for games with only two players. Furthermore it
is PPAD-complete to even find a 1
nθ(1)
-approximate Nash equilibrium [5]. In light of these negative
results, one direction is to identify subclasses of games for which the problem is tractable.
A two-player normal form game can be represented by two payoff matrices, say A and B, one
for each player, and hence is also known as bimatrix game [24]. For bimatrix games, polynomial
time NE computation algorithms are known for many subclasses, including zero-sum games [6],
(quasi-) concave games [20], and games with low rank payoff matrices [22]. A line of work focuses
⋆ Work done while the author was an intern at Microsoft Research India
on games of small rank, defined as rank(A + B) by Kannan and Theobald [17]. They gave a fully
polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for fixed rank games and recently Adsul et al.
[1] gave a polynomial time algorithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium for rank-1 games.
Specifying the two payoff matrices of a bimatrix game requires a polynomial number of entries
in the numbers of pure strategies available to the players. This is adequate when the set of pure
strategies are explicitly given. However, there are situations where the natural description gives
the set of pure strategies implicitly, and as a result they may be exponential in the description of
the game. For example, normal form (bimatrix) representation of two player extensive-form game
may have exponentially many strategies in the size of the extensive-form description [9]. In such a
case, even if the resulting bimatrix game has a fixed rank, the above results may not be applied for
efficient computation.
Nevertheless, certain types of extensive-form games have some combinatorial structure which
can be exploited. Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel [19] converted an arbitrary two-player, perfect-
recall, extensive form game into a payoff-equivalent two-player game with continuous strategy sets.
In this derived formulation, which they call the sequence form, there is a pair of payoff matrices A
and B, one for each player. Further, their strategy sets turn out to be compact polytopes in Euclidean
space of polynomial dimension. Given a pair of strategies (x, y), utilities of the players are xTAy
and xTBy respectively. Interestingly, the sequence form requires only a polynomial number of bits
to specify.
Motivated by the sequence form of Koller et al., we define bilinear games, which are two-player,
non-cooperative, single shot games represented by two payoff matrices, say A and B, of dimen-
sion M × N and two polytopal compact strategy sets X = {x ∈ RM | Ex = e, x ≥ 0} and
Y = {y ∈ RN | Fy = f , y ≥ 0}. If (x, y) ∈ X × Y is the played strategy profile, then xTAy and
xTBy are the utilities derived by player one and player two respectively. In other words, the pay-
offs are bilinear functions of strategies, hence the name bilinear games. The scope of bilinear games
is large enough to capture many interesting classes of games besides two-player extensive form
games with perfect recall. For example, for two-player Bayesian games [15,25], polymatrix games
[14], and various classes of optimization duels [16], researchers have proposed polynomial-sized
payoff-equivalent formulations which (either explicitly or implicitly) turn out to be bilinear games
(see Section 2.1 for details). Intuitively the polytopal strategy sets are concise representations of the
original sets of mixed strategies as marginal probabilities, and xTAy and xTBy express the expected
utilities of the original game in terms of these marginal probabilities.
Remark 1. Note that our formulation can express arbitrary polytopes as strategy space, for example
if the strategy set of a player is expressed as {x : Gx ≤ g}, i.e., the intersection of a set of half-spaces,
it can be transformed to an equivalent game with strategy set {x′ : Ex′ = e, x′ ≥ 0} using standard
techniques (i.e., by adding slack variables, substituting unbounded xi with x
+
i − x
−
i , x
+
i , x
−
i ≥ 0, and
modifying the payoff matrices accordingly).
Aswe have seen that many different types of games can be concisely described as bilinear games,
designing efficient algorithms for the more general bilinear games seem to be important as well as
challenging. Since bimatrix games is a subclass of bilinear games (see Section 2.1), all the hardness
results of bimatrix games automatically apply to bilinear games as well. Therefore, the only hope
is to design efficient algorithms or FPTAS for the special subclasses. There are many similarities
between bilinear and bimatrix games, for example, payoffs are represented by two matrices, and
utilities are bilinear functions of strategy vectors, hence it is natural to try to adapt algorithms for
bimatrix games to bilinear games. However, a technical challenge is that the polytopal strategy sets
of bilinear games are generally much more complex than the bimatrix case; in particular the number
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of vertices may be exponential, while the set of mixed strategies is just a simplex. Recently, we were
pointed to the constrained games, similar to bilinear games, considered by Charnes [3]. The lin-
ear programming technique by Charnes [3] also works for zero-sum bilinear games, i.e., those with
(A+ B) = 0 (see also [18] for sequence form, [16] for another derivation, [25] for zero-sum Bayesian
games and [8] for zero-sum polymatrix games). Further, it is easy to show that the linear comple-
mentarity program (LCP) characterization for the set of NE of a sequence form game [19] works for
bilinear games as well. However the Lemke-Howson algorithm may not be directly applied to the
general bilinear games. There are results for certain subclasses of bilinear games with specific struc-
ture in their strategy sets, e.g., Howson and Rosenthal [15] adapted the Lemke-Howson algorithm
to two-player Bayesian games and Koller et al.[19] adapted Lemke’s algorithm [21] to two-player
extensive-form games.
Our Contribution. In Section 2, we define the bilinear game and show that the existence of a (sym-
metric) Nash equilibrium in a (symmetric) bilinear game directly follows from the known results.
Note that given a strategy of a player, the other player would like to play a utility maximizing strat-
egy. We formulate this problem as a primal-dual LP, similar to the Koller et al. formulation. Using
the complementarity conditions of the primal-dual, we characterize the Nash equilibria and then
define Best Response Polytopes (BRPs) and the notion of fully-labeled pairs in BRPs. Further, we show
one-to-one correspondence between the Nash equilibria and fully-labeled pairs. This in turn gives a
quadratic programming (QP) formulation for the NE computation problem.
Next, we extendKannan and Theobald’s [17] rank-based hierarchy for bimatrix games to bilinear
games, by defining the rank of a bilinear game with payoff matrices (A, B) as the rank of (A +
B). Zero-sum games are rank-0 games and a NE for these games can be computed efficiently, as
discussed above. In Section 3, we show that in spite of a very general structure of the strategy sets
in bilinear games, the basic approach given by Adsul et al. [1] to compute a NE of a rank-1 bimatrix
game, can be generalized to compute a NE of a rank-1 bilinear game by solving a rank-1 QP. While
solving a rank-1 general QP is NP-hard [12], those arising from the bilinear games can be solved in
polynomial time. In Section 4, we discuss two FPTAS algorithms for the fixed rank bilinear games,
which are generalization of the algorithms by Kannan and Theobald [17] for the bimatrix games.
Finally, in Section 5, using the structure of BRPs, we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for the case
when the rank of either A or B is a constant, and rank of E and F are also constant. Since, a bimatrix
game can be thought of as a bilinear game with E and F being a single row of 1s (see Example 1
of Section 2.1), this algorithm improves upon a result by Lipton et al. [22] and Kannan et al. [17]
for bimatrix games, where they require the rank of both A and B to be constant. This approach also
gives an enumeration algorithm for extreme equilibria, which runs in polynomial time under the
above assumption and exponential time for the general bilinear games.
The following table summarizes all the NE computation results while keeping the bimatrix
games in perspective.
Results Bimatrix games Bilinear games
Existence of (symmetric) NE Nash [23] Easy to show using ([23]) [10]
LCP formulation for NE Known [24] Koller et al. [19]
NE as fully-labeled pairs of BRPs Known [27] This paper
Zero-sum games Linear programming [6] Linear programming [18]
Rank-1 games Adsul et al. [1] This paper
FPTAS for fixed rank games Kannan and Theobald [17] This paper
Games with low rank matrices Lipton et al. [22] This paper
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2 Bilinear Games and Nash Equilibria
Notations. We consider a vector x as a column vector by default and for the row vector, we use
transpose (i.e., xT). A “0” in the block representation of a matrix, is the matrix with all zero entries
of appropriate dimension, and “1k” is a vector of all 1s of length k. Let x ∈ R
n be a vector and
c ∈ R be a scalar, then by x ≤ c we mean, ∀i ≤ n, xi ≤ c. For a given matrix X, Xi denotes the
ith row of X, X j denotes the jth column of X and |X| denotes the maximum absolute entry in X,
i.e., |X| = maxij |Xij|. For a set S, ∆(S) denotes the set of probability distribution vectors over the
elements of S, i.e., ∆(S) = {x ∈ R|S| | x ≥ 0, ∑i∈S xi = 1}.
Bilinear games are two-player non-cooperative, single shot games. A bilinear game is repre-
sented by two M× N dimensional payoff matrices A and B, one for each player, and two compact
polytopal strategy sets. Let S1 = {1, . . . ,M} be the set of rows and S2 = {1, . . . ,N} be the set of
columns of the matrices. Let E ∈ Rk1×M and F ∈ Rk2×N be the matrices, and e ∈ Rk1 and f ∈ Rk2
be the vectors. The strategy set of the first-player is X = {x ∈ RM | Ex = e, x ≥ 0} and the second-
player is Y = {y ∈ RN | Fy = f , y ≥ 0}. Sets X and Y are assumed to be compact. From a strategy
profile (x, y) ∈ X × Y, the payoffs obtained by the first and the second player are xTAy and xTBy
respectively.
From aNash equilibrium (NE) strategy profile, no player gains by unilateral deviation. Formally,
Definition 1. A strategy profile (x, y) ∈ X × Y is a NE of the game (A, B) iff xTAy ≥ x′TAy, ∀x′ ∈ X
and xTBy ≥ xTBy′, ∀y′ ∈ Y.
As a direct corollary of Glicksberg’s [10] result that there always exists a Nash equilibrium in a
game whose players’ strategy spaces are convex and compact, and whose utility function for each
player i is continuous in all players’ strategies and quasi-concave in i’s strategy, we have
Proposition 1. Every bilinear game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
A bilinear game is completely represented by a six-tuple (A, B, E, F, e, f ) in general. However,
for ease of notation we represent it by (A, B) fixing (E, F, e, f ). Given a strategy y ∈ Y of the second-
player, the objective of the first player is to play x ∈ X such that xT(Ay) is maximized, i.e., solve the
following linear program [19].
max : xT(Ay)
s.t. Ex = e
x ≥ 0
Dual−−→
min : eTp
s.t. ETp ≥ Ay
(1)
Note that pi is the dual variable of the equation Eix = ei in the above program. At the optimal
point (x, p) of (1), we get xi > 0 ⇒ Aiy = p
TEi, ∀i ∈ S1 from the complementarity. A similar
condition can be obtained for the second-player, given an x ∈ X. At a Nash equilibrium both the
conditions are satisfied, and these characterize the NE strategies as follows: A strategy pair (x, y) ∈
X × Y is a Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B) iff it satisfies the following conditions.
∃p ∈ Rk1 s.t. Ay ≤ ETp and ∀i ∈ S1, xi > 0 ⇒ Aiy = p
TEi
∃q ∈ Rk2 s.t. xTB ≤ qTF and ∀j ∈ S2, yj > 0 ⇒ x
TBj = qTFj
(2)
The above characterization implies that, a player plays a strategywith non-zero probability only
if it gives the maximum payoff with respect to (w.r.t.) the opponent’s strategy in some sense. Such
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strategies are called the best response strategies (w.r.t. the opponent’s strategy). Using this fact, we
define best response polytopes (BRPs), similar to the best response polytopes of a bimatrix game [27].
In the following expression, x, y, p and q are vector variables.
P = { (y, p) ∈ RN+k1 | Aiy− p
TEi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ S1; yj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ S2; Fy = f}
Q = { (x, q) ∈ RM+k2 | xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S1; x
TBj − qTFj ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ S2; Ex = e}
(3)
The polytope P in (3) is closely related to the best response strategies of the first-player for any
given strategy of the second-player and it is called the best response polytope of the first-player.
Similarly Q is called the best response polytope of the second-player. Note that, in both the polytopes
the first set of inequalities corresponds to the first-player, and the second set corresponds to the
second-player. Since |S1| = M and |S2| = N, let the inequalities be numbered from 1 toM, andM+ 1
to M+ N in both the polytopes. Let the label L(v) of a point v in the polytope be the set of indices of
the tight inequalities at v. If a pair (v,w) ∈ P× Q is such that L(v) ∪ L(w) = {1, . . . ,M+ N}, then
it is called a fully-labeled pair. The proof of the next lemma follows using (2).
Lemma 1. A strategy profile (x, y) is a NE of the game (A, B) iff ((y, p), (x, q)) ∈ P× Q is a fully-labeled
pair, for some p and q.
A game is called non-degenerate if both the polytopes are non-degenerate. Note that a fully-
labeled pair of a non-degenerate game has to be a vertex-pair. Lemma 1 implies that a NE strategy
profile has to satisfy the following linear complementarity conditions (LCP) over P×Q [19].
((y, p), (x, q)) ∈ P× Q corresponds to a NE ⇔ xT(Ay− ETp) = 0 and
(xTB− qTF)y = 0 (4)
Clearly, xT(Ay− ETp) ≤ 0 and (xTB− qTF)y ≤ 0 over P×Q and hence xT(Ay− ETp) + (xTB−
qTF)y ≤ 0. Simplifying the expression using Ex = e and Fy = f we get xT(A+ B)y− eTp− f Tq ≤ 0
over P×Q and equality holds iff (x, y) is a NE (using (4)). This gives the following QP formulation
which captures all the NE of game (A, B) at its optimal points.
max: xT(A+ B)y− eTp− f Tq
s.t. ((y, p), (x, q)) ∈ P× Q
(5)
Symmetric Bilinear Games.Nash [23] proved that any symmetric finite game has a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. The concept of symmetry can be straightforwardly adapted to the bilinear games: We
say a bilinear game is symmetric if B = AT, E = F, and e = f . A strategy profile (x, y) is symmetric
if x = y. A straightforward adaptation of Nash’s [23] proof yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Any symmetric bilinear game has a symmetric NE.
Note that for a symmetric game (A, AT), strategy sets X and Y are the same. From (2) and (4), it
is clear that a symmetric NE x ∈ X must satisfy q = p, Ax ≤ ETp, xT(Ax− ETp) = 0. This gives
the following QP formulation to capture all symmetric NE of a symmetric game (A, E, e).
max: xTAx− eTp
s.t. Ax ≤ ETp; Ex = e; x ≥ 0
(6)
A bilinear game (A, B, E, F, e, f ) can be converted to an equivalent symmetric game (A′, E′, e′),
where
A′ =
[
0 A
BT 0
]
, E′ =
[
E 0
0 F
]
, e′ =
[
e
f
]
, with strategy vector z =
[
x
y
]
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It is easy to check that any symmetric NE of the derived game corresponds to a NE of the original
game and vice-versa. In the next section,we discuss reductions of different games to polynomial size
bilinear games, which do not seem to be possible with the bimatrix games.
2.1 Examples of Bilinear Games
The simplest subclass of bilinear games is the set of two-player normal-form games (bimatrix games).
Example 1. Bimatrix Games
A bimatrix game (A, B) with A, B ∈ RM×N can be straightforwardly transformed to the bilinear
game (A, B, E, F, e, f ) where ET = 1M, e = 1 and similarly F
T = 1N , f = 1. ⊓⊔
Many other interesting classes of finite games may be formulated as bilinear games. In this sec-
tion, we provide a few examples where the bilinear formulation are exponentially smaller than a
direct bimatrix formulation.
Example 2. Two-player Bayesian Games
In a Bayesian game [13], there is a type set associated with each player, which is her private infor-
mation. The nature draws the type for each player from a joint distribution, which is a common
knowledge, and each player gets to know only her own type before choosing an action. The final
utilities of the game is determined by types of all the players, and hence are uncertain.
Here we consider the two-player case, where Tis are the type sets and Sis are the strategy sets.
The joint probability distribution is denoted by pts for the type profile (t, s) ∈ T1 × T2. Let S =
S1 × S2, T = T1 × T2, |Ti| = ti and |Si| = mi. The utilities are the functions of actions and types, i.e.,
ui : S× T → R, hence for every type profile they can be represented by the two matrices. For a type
profile (t, s) let Ats and Bts denote the respective m1×m2 dimensional payoff matrices. The strategy
of a player is to decide her play for each of her type so that her expected payoff is maximized, i.e.,
x : T1 → ∆(S1) for player one and y : T2 → ∆(S2) for player two. For a t ∈ T1, let x
t denote the
mixed strategy given type t.
The induced normal form of this game is a bimatrix game in which each pure strategy of a player
prescribes an action for each of her types. Thus the size of the induced normal form is exponential in
the number of types. However, it can be formulated as a polynomial sized bilinear game as follows
A =


p11A
11 · · · p1t2A
1t2
...
. . .
...
pt11A
t11 · · · pt1t2A
t1t2

 , B =


p11B
11 · · · p1t2B
1t2
...
. . .
...
pt11B
t11 · · · pt1t2B
t1t2

 , E =


1Tm 0 · · ·
0 1Tm
...
. . .

 , F =


1Tn 0 · · ·
0 1Tn
...
. . .


and e = 1t1 , f = 1t2 . Given mixed strategies x
1, . . . , xt1 , y1, . . . , yt2 of the Bayesian game, define
x = [x1
T
, · · · , xt
T
1 ]T and y = [y1
T
, · · · , yt
T
2 ]T. Then xTAy and xTBy are exactly the expected utilities
of the Bayesian game. This transformation is implicit in Howson and Rosenthal’s [15] adaptation of
Lemke-Howson algorithm to two-player Bayesian games. ⊓⊔
Example 3. Polymatrix Games [14]
A polymatrix game is an n-player game in which each player’s utility is the sum of the utilities
resulting from her bilateral interactions with each of the n− 1 other players. Let Si be player i’s set
of pure strategies. The game is represented by the payoff matrices Aij ∈ R|Si|×|Sj| for all pairs of
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players (i, j). Let xi ∈ ∆(Si) denote a mixed strategy of player i. Given a strategy profile (x
1, . . . , xn),
the expected utility of player i is,
ui(x
1, . . . , xn) = ∑
j 6=i
(xi)TAijxj
We show that any polymatrix game can be transformed to a symmetric bilinear game such that
any symmetric NE of the bilinear game corresponds to a NE of the polymatrix game. Our derivation
is adapted from Howson’s [14] formulation of NE of polymatrix games as solutions of an LCP.
Formally, given a polymatrix game, we define the induced symmetric bilinear game as (A, AT, E, E, e, e),
where
A =


0 A12 · · · A1n
A21 0 A2n
...
. . .
An1 An2 0

 , E =


1T|S1 |
0 · · · 0
0 1T|S2| · · · 0
...
. . .
0 0 · · · 1T|Sn|

 ,
and e = 1n. The space of strategy vectors is x = [x1
T
· · · xn
T
]T .
Proposition 3. Consider a polymatrix game of n players. The strategy (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is an NE of the game
if and only if (x, x) is a symmetric NE of its induced bilinear game.
Proof. The proof is relatively straightforward, by observing that the respective incentive constraints
are equivalent. Thus the problem of finding a NE of a polymatrix game reduces to the problem of
finding a symmetric NE of a symmetric bilinear game. Note that an asymmetric NE doesn’t corre-
spond to a NE of the polymatrix game. ⊓⊔
Immorlica et al. [16] analyzed several classes of games between two optimization algorithms
whose objectives are to outperform each other. The space of pure strategies are the possible outputs
of the algorithm which are exponential, however the authors were able to formulate some of these
games as zero-sum bilinear games (which they call bilinear duels). We describe one example from
[16].
Example 4. Ranking Duels [16]
Each player chooses a ranking overm elements. Thus the number of pure strategies is exponential in
m. Such a ranking can be represented as a m×m permutation matrix. By the Birkoff-von Neumann
theorem, the space of mixed strategies corresponds to the space of m×m doubly-stochastic matrices
with each row and each column sum to 1. This space can be described by the polytope {x ∈ Rm
2
| x ≥
0; ∀i, ∑j xij = 1; ∀j,∑i xij = 1}. Viewing x and y as column vectors, the sizes of the corresponding
E, e are polynomial inm. Immorlica et al. [16] constructedmatrices A ∈ Rm
2×m2 such that the players’
expected utilities are equal to xTAy and −xTAy respectively. ⊓⊔
Example 5. Two-player Perfect-recall Extensive-form Games
Extensive-form represents a dynamic game as a tree [26], where every pure strategy of a player
prescribes a move at each of the player’s information sets. As a result the number of pure strategies
may be exponential in the size of the extensive-form description. Fortunately, if we assume perfect
recall—roughly, that each player remembers all her past decisions and observations—then there
always exists a Nash equilibrium in behavior strategies, where each player independently chooses
a distribution over actions at each of her information sets. Representation of a behavior strategy
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requires space linear in the extensive form. However, the expected utilities of the two-player perfect-
recall extensive-form games are not bilinear functions of the behavior strategies. Koller et al. [19]
proposed the sequence form, which is a bilinear game formulation for these games. The number of
rows and columns of thematrices A and B, in the bilinear form, are the number of feasible sequences
of plays of the first and second player respectively. If a play sequence pair (i, j) leads to a leaf node
then the ijth entry of A and B are the payoffs of the first and second player at that leaf node, otherwise
it is zero ⋆. A strategy x of the first player is such that, x(root) = 1, and if a sequence σ ends at an
information node C, then ∑a∈Actions(C) xσa − xσ = 0. Similar conditions hold for a strategy y of the
second player. Such a strategy may be transformed to a behavior strategy and vice versa. This gives
E, F, e and f . Note that the reduction is polynomial sized and xTAy and xTBy are exactly the expected
payoffs under the corresponding behavior strategies. We refer readers to [19] for more details. ⊓⊔
Remark 2. Lemke’s algorithm on the LCP formulation of bilinear games terminates with a solution
(i.e., not at a ray) if the only non-negative solutions x and y to Ex = 0 and Fy = 0 are x = 0 and
y = 0, and the payoff matrices are non-positive, i.e., A ≤ 0 and B ≤ 0. This result directly follows
from [19]. Note that games of all the above examples satisfy these requirements, without loss of
generality.
The rank of a game (A, B) is defined as rank(A + B), and we consider the rank based hierarchy
of the bilinear games. The set of rank-k games consists of all (A, B) such that rank(A + B) ≤ k.
Zero-sum games are rank-0 games, the smallest set in the hierarchy. Koller et al. [18] gave an LP for-
mulation for zero-sum bilinear games, derived from two-player extensive form games with perfect
recall. However, their formulation works for general bilinear games as well. Beyond rank-0 games,
no polynomial time algorithm is known for NE computation (even for the reduction specific formu-
lations). In the next section, we extend the polynomial time solvability of Nash equilibrium for the
rank-1 bilinear games.
For all the algorithms that follow, we make the following assumptions (without loss of general-
ity): 1) The entries of A, B, E, F, e and f are integers, since scaling them by a positive number does
not change the set of NE. 2) The equalities Ex = e and Fy = f are all linearly independent because
even if we discard the dependent equalities, X and Y do not change. 3) The letter L denotes the bit
length of the input game.
3 Rank-1 Games and Polynomial Time Algorithm
The approach used in this section is motivated by the paper [1]. Given a rank-1 game (A, B), it is
easy to find α ∈ RM and β ∈ RN such that A+ B = α · βT , since any two rows of A+ B are multiple
of each other. In that case B = −A+ α · βT . Let G(α) = (A,−A+ α · βT) be a parametrized game
for a fixed A ∈ RM×N and β ∈ RN . For any game G(α) the BRP of first-player is fixed to P(α) = P
(of (3)) since A is fixed. However, the BRP of second-player Q(α) changes with the parameter. Now,
consider the following polytope with x, q as vector variables and λ as a scalar variable:
Q′ = { (x,λ, q) ∈ RM+1+k2 | xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S1; x
T(−Aj) + λβ j − q
TFj ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ S2; Ex = e} (7)
It is easy to see that Q(α) is the projection of {(x,λ, q) ∈ Q′ | λ = xTα} on (x, q)-space. In other
words, Q(α) is a section of Q′ obtained by hyper-plane λ = xTα. Clearly, Q′ covers Q(α), ∀α ∈ RM.
Number the equations of Q′ in a similar way as the equations of Q. LetN be the set of fully-labeled
⋆ Due to chance moves, the entry may correspond tomultiple leaf nodes. In that case the entry stores the expected payoff.
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pairs of P×Q′, i.e.,N = {(v,w) ∈ P×Q′ | L(v) ∪ L(w) = {1, . . . ,M+ N}}. Using the definition of
fully-labeled pairs, it is easy to check that for a given ((y, p), (x,λ, q)) ∈ P×Q′,
((y, p), (x,λ, q)) ∈ N ⇔ xT(Ay− ETp) = 0 and (xT(−A) + λβT − qTF)y = 0 (8)
Lemma 2. Let (v,w) ∈ N , v = (y, p) and w = (x,λ, q).
– For all α such that λ = xTα, (x, y) is a NE of G(α).
– For every NE (x, y) of a game G(α), there exists a (v,w) ∈ N , where λ = xTα.
Proof. Since (v,w) is fully-labeled it satisfies, xT(Ay− ETp) = 0 and (xT(−A) + λβT − qTF)y = 0.
Let α be such that λ = xTα then we get (xT(−A) + (xTα)βT − qTF)y = 0 ⇒ (xT(−A + αβT) −
qTF)y = 0. This implies that (x, y) is a NE of the game (A,−A+ αβT) (i.e., G(α)), since it satisfies
the complementarity condition of (4).
Given a (x, y) of G(α), from (2) and (4) it is clear that ∃p, q such that xT(Ay − ETp) = 0 and
(xT(−A + αβT) − qTF)y = 0. Let λ = xTα, then we get (xT(−A) + λβT − qTF)y = 0. Therefore,
((y, p), (x,λ, q)) ∈ N . ⊓⊔
The above lemma establishes strong relation between the set of NE of all the G(α)s and the set
N . Next we discuss the structure of N , and later use it to design a polynomial time algorithm to
find a NE of a given game G(α).
The polytopes P and Q′ are assumed to be non-degenerate3, and let k1 = k2 = k for simplicity.
As there are k linearly independent equalities in P and Q′, they are of dimension N and M + 1
respectively. Therefore, ∀(v,w) ∈ N , |L(v)| ≤ N and |L(w)| ≤ M + 1. Since, M + N labels are
required for a pair (v,w) to be part ofN ,N ⊂ 1-skeleton of P×Q′. Further, if (v,w) ∈ N is a vertex
pair then |L(v) ∩ L(w)| = 1. Let the label in the intersection be called the duplicate label of (v,w).
Relaxing the inequality corresponding to the duplicate label at (v,w) in P and Q′ respectively gives
its two adjacent edges in N . Therefore, every vertex of N has degree two. This implies that N is
a set of cycles and infinite paths (unbounded edges at both the ends). We will show that N forms
a single infinite path. The next lemma follows directly from the definition of P (3) and Q′ (7), and
expression (8).
Lemma 3. For all (v,w) = ((y, p), (x,λ, q)) ∈ P×Q′, we have λ(βTy)− eT p− f Tq ≤ 0, and the equality
holds iff (v,w) ∈ N .
Lemma 3 implies thatN is captured by λ(βTy)− eTp− f Tq = 0 over P×Q′. Using this fact and
Lemma 3, we define the following parametrized LP.
LP(δ) − max: δ(βTy)− eTp− f Tq
s.t. P×Q′; λ = δ
For an a ∈ R, let OPT(a) be the set of optimal solutions of LP(a) and N (a) be the set of points
of N with λ = a, i.e.,N = {(v,w) ∈ N | w = (x,λ, q) and λ = a}.
Lemma 4. For an a ∈ R,N (a) 6= ∅ and OPT(a) = N (a)
Proof. Consider a game G(α) where α = [a, . . . , a]. Clearly, for any Nash equilibrium (x, y) of G(α)
the corresponding point inN has λ = xTα = a (Lemma 2). Therefore,N (a) 6= ∅. The feasible set of
LP(a) is all points of P× Q′ with λ = a. Further, function λ(βTy) − eTp− f Tq achieves maximum
only at points onN (Lemma 3). Therefore,OPT(a) = N (a) follows. ⊓⊔
3 Degeneracy may be handled using standard techniques as done in [1].
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Lemma 5. The set N forms an infinite path, with λ being monotonic on it.
Proof. To the contrary suppose there are cycles and multiple paths in N . Let C be a cycle in N . It is
easy to see that N (a) = intersection of N with the hyper-plane λ = a. Therefore, ∃a ∈ R, such that
either C is contained in λ = a or it cuts the cycle at exactly two points. This contradicts that N (a) is
a convex set in both the cases (Lemma 4).
Now let P1 and P2 be two paths in N . Since, N (a) is a convex set ∀a ∈ R, λ is monotonic on
both the paths. Suppose, the range of λ covered by P1 and P2 be (−∞, a] and (a, inf). However, this
contradicts the fact that P2 is a closed set. Monotonicity of λ follows from the convexity ofN (a). ⊓⊔
3.1 Algorithm
Let (A, B) be a given rank-1 game and A + B = γ · βT . Let γmin = minx∈X ∑i∈S1 γixi and γmax =
maxx∈X ∑i∈S1 γixi. The γmin and γmax exists since X is a bounded polytope. From Lemma 2 it is clear
that every point in the intersection of the setN and hyper-plane Hγ : λ−∑i∈S1 γixi = 0 corresponds
to a NE of the given game (A, B). Note that for any point in the intersection, corresponding λ is
between γmin and γmax. Let H
−
γ and H
+
γ be the negative and positive half spaces of the hyper-plane
Hγ respectively, then clearly N (γmin) ∈ H
−
γ and N (γmax) ∈ H
+
γ . All the points in the intersection
ofN and Hγ are betweenN (γmin) and N (γmax). The following algorithm does binary search onN
betweenN (γmin) andN (γmax) to find a point in the intersection using the fact that λmonotonically
increases (similar to the algorithm in [1]).
S1 Initialize a1 = γmin and a2 = γmax.
S2 If the edge containing N (a1) or N (a2) intersects Hγ, then output the intersection and exit.
S3 Let a =
a1+a2
2 . Let u, v be the edge containing N (a).
S4 If u, v intersects Hγ, then output the intersection and exit.
S5 Else if u, v ∈ H−γ , then set a1 = a else set a2 = a and continue from step S3.
Correctness. Since the feasible set of LP(a) is a section of P × Q′, where λ = a, the OPT(a) is on
an edge of P × Q′ (assuming non-degeneracy of LP(a)). It is easy to construct this edge from the
tight equations of P× Q′ at OPT(a). Clearly, this entire edge should be part of the set N , hence if
this edge intersects the hyper-plane Hγ then we get a Nash equilibrium of the given game. Since, all
the points in the intersection ofN and Hγ are betweenN (γmin) and N (γmax), and λmonotonically
increases between these two (Lemma 5), the algorithm does a simple binary search between γmin
and γmax to find an a, such that the edge containing N (a) = OPT(a) intersects Hγ (Lemma 4).
Time Complexity. Recall that L is the bit length of the input game. Since, γmin and γmax are op-
timal points of two LPs on set X = {Ex = e, x ≥ 0}, they can be represented in poly(L,M,N) bits.
Let Z = max{|A|, |E|, |F|, |e|, | f |, |γ|, |β|}, l = M+ N + k1 + k2 + 1, and ∆ = l!Zl .
Theorem 1. The above algorithm finds a NE of game (A, B) in time poly(L,M,N).
Proof. One round of steps S3 to S5 can be done in polynomial time since computation of N (a) re-
quires solving LP(a) (Lemma 4), and computation of u, v ∩ Hγ requires checking the feasibility of
a polytope. Now, to show polynomial time complexity, we need to bound the number of rounds of
steps S3 to S5.
Note that the denominator of any co-ordinate of a vertex of P× Q′ is at most ∆, and if λ is not
constant on an edge of N , then the difference in its value between the two end points of the edge is
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at least 1
∆2
. Therefore, if a2 − a1 <
1
∆2
the algorithm terminates. After k rounds a2 − a1 =
γmax−γmin
2k
. In
round k if a2 − a1 =
γmax−γmin
2k
>
1
∆2
, then k < log(γmax − γmin) + 2 log∆. Therefore, the algorithm is
guaranteed to terminate after log(γmax − γmin) + 2 log∆ + 1 = poly(L,M,N) many rounds. ⊓⊔
4 FPTAS for Rank-k Games
In this section, we discuss fully polynomial time approximation schemes for fixed rank games (i.e.,
rank(A+ B) is constant). The approximation notion in bilinear games can be defined in a similar way
to that of bimatrix games given by Kannan et al. [17]. Let xmax = maxx∈X ∑i xi, ymax = maxy∈Y ∑j yj
and D = |A+ B|. Clearly the total payoff derived from a strategy profile (x, y) ∈ X × Y is at most
xmaxDymax. Using this we define an ǫ-approximate NE for a bilinear game (A, B) as follows.
Definition 2. For a strategy profile (x, y) ∈ X×Y, let u = maxx′∈X x
′TAy and v = maxy′∈Y x
TBy′. Then
(x, y) is an ǫ-approximate NE of the game (A, B) if u+ v− xT(A+ B)y ≤ ǫ(xmaxDymax).
For a bimatrix game xmaxDymax = D, since x and y are probability distributions, which is com-
patible with the definition of [17]. Next we define a stronger notion of ǫ-approximate NE called
relative ǫ-approximate NE, where the error is relative to the maximum achievable payoff from the
given strategy.
Definition 3. For a strategy profile (x, y) ∈ X×Y, let u = maxx′∈X x
′TAy and v = maxy′∈Y x
TBy′. Then
(x, y) is a relative ǫ-approximate NE of the game (A, B) if u+ v− xT(A+ B)y ≤ ǫ(u+ v), i.e., the total
error is relatively small.
Since the value of u + v is at most xmaxDymax, if (x, y) is relative ǫ-approximate NE, then it is
also ǫ-approximate NE. For all the examples mentioned in Section 2.1, a (relative) approximate NE
of the bilinear game formulation can be straightforwardly turned into a (relative) approximate NE
of the corresponding finite game under standard definitions. Without loss of generality we assume
that A, B, E, F, e and f are integer matrices, since scaling them by a positive value does not change
the set of (relative) ǫ-approximate NE. Next we discuss two FPTAS to solve QP of (5), one for each
definition of approximation. The approaches used in these algorithms are generalization of the ones
in [17].
4.1 FPTAS for Approximate NE
We show that the result by Vavasis [28] can be applied to get an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium
(Definition 2). The following proposition states the result by Vavasis.
Proposition 4. Let min{ 12 x
TQx + qTx : Ax ≤ b} be a quadratic optimization problem with compact
polytope {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b}, and let the rank of Q be a fixed constant. If x∗ and x# denote points minimizing
and maximizing the objective function f (x) = 12x
TQx+ qTx in the feasible region, respectively, then one can
find in time poly(L, 1ǫ ) a point x
⋄ satisfying
f (x⋄)− f (x∗) ≤ ǫ( f (x#)− f (x∗)).
Now consider the following QP formulation of (5), which captures all the NE of (A, B) at its optimal.
min: eTp+ f Tq− xT(A+ B)y
s.t. Ay− ETp ≤ 0; Fy = f ; y ≥ 0
xTB− qTF ≤ 0; Ex = e; x ≥ 0
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Theorem 2. Let (A, B) be a rank-k game, then for every ǫ > 0, an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium can be
computed in time poly(L, 1ǫ ), where L is the bit length of the game and k is a constant.
Proof. The objective function of the above QP can be easily transformed to the standard QP form
1
2x
TQx+ qTx, where rank(Q) = 2k. To apply Proposition 4 on this QP, we need to bound its feasible
set. Since, {x : Ex = e, x ≥ 0} and {y : Fy = f , y ≥ 0} are compact, the only variables to bound are
ps and qs. Since, the maximum possible value of xT(A+ B)y for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y is xmaxDymax,
the value of eTp+ f Tq is at most xmaxDymax at any point of the polytope corresponding to NE (by
(4)). Therefore, we impose eTp+ f Tq ≤ xmaxDymax. However, this may not bound the ps and qs.
Let Z = max{|A|, |B|, |E|, |F|, |e|, | f |} and l = M+N+ k1+ k2. Recall that NE of a non-degenerate
game correspond to vertices of the polytope. It is easy to see that maximum absolute value of a co-
ordinate of any vertex in the polytope is at most l!Zl . Further, the quantity l!Zl can be represented in
poly(L) bits. Therefore, imposing−l!Zl ≤ p ≤ l!Zl and−l!Zl ≤ q ≤ l!Zl in the above QP incur only
a polynomial increase in its representation and does not change its optimal set. The minimum and
the maximum objective values of this QP are zero (Lemma 3) and at most 2xmaxDymax respectively.
Let ((y⋄, p⋄), (x⋄, q⋄)) be the solution given by Vavasis algorithm for ǫ2 , then from Proposition 4 we
get,
eTp⋄ + f Tq⋄ − x⋄T(A+ B)y⋄ ≤ ǫ(xmaxDymax)
From the primal-dual formulation of (1) it is clear that maxx′∈X x
′TAy⋄ ≤ eTp⋄ andmaxy′∈Y x
⋄TBy′ ≤
f Tq⋄. Therefore, we get maxx′∈X x
′TAy⋄ +maxy′∈Yx
⋄TBy′ − x⋄T(A+ B)y⋄ ≤ ǫ(xmaxDymax). ⊓⊔
4.2 FPTAS for Relative Approximate NE
Let the rank of a game (A, B) be k, then A+ B = ∑ki=1 α(i)β(i)
T , where ∀i, α(i) ∈ RM and β(i) ∈ RN .
We assume that the game is such that α(i)s and β(i)s are positive vectors. For all i ≤ k, let wi =
minx∈X x
Tα(i) and w′i = maxx∈X x
Tα(i), similarly let zi = miny∈Y β(i)
Ty and z′i = maxy∈Y β(i)
Ty.
Note thatwi,w
′
i, zi and z
′
i can be represented by poly(L,M,N) bits, since X andY are compact. Given
an ǫ > 0, consider the sub-intervals [wi, (1+ ǫ)wi], [(1+ ǫ)wi, (1+ ǫ)
2wi] of [wi,w
′
i] and similarly of
[zi, z
′
i]. All combinations of these intervals form a grid in 2k-dimensional box B = ×i[wi,w
′
i]×i [zi, z
′
i].
Let (x, y) ∈ X × Y be such that ∀i, xTα(i) ∈ [ui, (1+ ǫ)ui] and β(i)
Ty ∈ [vi, (1+ ǫ)vi], then clearly,
k
∑
i=1
uivi ≤ x
T(A+ B)y ≤ (1+ ǫ)2
k
∑
i=1
uivi (9)
For a fixed hyper-cube of the grid, consider the following LP based on the QP of (5)
min: eTp+ f Tq
s.t. Ay ≤ ETp, Fy = f , y ≥ 0
xTB ≤ qTF; Ex = e; x ≥ 0
ui ≤ x
Tα(i) ≤ (1+ ǫ)ui; vi ≤ β(i)
Ty ≤ (1+ ǫ)vi, ∀i
Algorithm.Run the above LP for each hyper-cube of the grid, and output an optimal point of the one
giving the best approximation. As the number of hyper-cubes in the grid is poly(L, 1/ log(1+ ǫ)),
the running time of the algorithm is poly(M,N,L, 1/ log(1+ ǫ)).
Correctness. Next we show that the above algorithm gives
(
1− 1
(1+ǫ)2
)
-approximate NE of the
game (A, B). Let (x′, y′) be a NE of the given game, and (p′, q′) be such that x′TAy′ = eTp′ and
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x′TBy′ = f Tq′. Consider the hyper-cube containing (x′Tα(1), . . . , x′Tα(k), β(1)Ty′, . . . , β(k)Ty′) of
the grid and corresponding LP. Clearly, (x′, y′, p′, q′) is a feasible point of this LP and ∑ki=1 uivi ≤
eTp′ + f Tq′ ≤ (1+ ǫ)2 ∑ki=1 uivi, since e
Tp′ + f Tq′ = x′T(A + B)y′. Therefore, at the optimal point
(x˜, y˜, p˜, q˜) of the LP we get eT p˜+ f T q˜ ≤ (1+ ǫ)2 ∑ki=1 uivi, and this gives,
x˜T(A+ B)y˜ ≥ ∑ki=1 uivi ≥
eT p˜+ f Tq˜
(1+ǫ)2
(using (9))
⇒ eT p˜+ f T q˜− x˜T(A+ B)y˜ ≤
(
1− 1
(1+ǫ)2
)
(eT p˜+ f T q˜)
Let µ =
(
1− 1
(1+ǫ)2
)
, u˜ = maxγ∈X γ
TAy˜, and v˜ = maxγ∈Y x˜
TBγ. Clearly, eT p˜ ≥ u˜ and f T q˜ ≥ v˜
(using (1)). Let D = eT p˜+ f T q˜− u˜− v˜, then u˜+ v˜− x˜T(A+ B)y˜ = eT p˜+ f T q˜− D− x˜T(A+ B)y˜ ≤
µ(eT p˜+ f T q˜) − D ≤ µ(eT p˜ + f T q˜ − D) = µ(u˜ + v˜), since µ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, (x˜, y˜) is a relative
µ-approximate NE of the given game (A, B) (Definition 3).
Theorem 3. Let (A, B) be a rank-k game, and A + B = ∑ki=1 α(i)β(i)
T , such that α(i)s and β(j)s are
positive vectors. Then given an ǫ > 0, a relative
(
1− 1
(1+ǫ)2
)
-approximate NE can be computed in time
poly(L, 1/ log(1+ ǫ)), where L is the input bit length. ⊓⊔
For a symmetric game (B = AT, E = F, e = f ), an (relative) ǫ-approximate symmetric NE can
be defined as an (relative) ǫ-approximate NE with the same strategies, i.e., x = y. It is easy to check
that, if we use the QP formulation of (6) instead of (5) in any of these algorithms, then the output
strategy is an (relative) ǫ-approximate symmetric NE strategy.
5 Games with a Low Rank Matrix
In this section we show that if rank of even one payoff matrix (A or B) is constant, then Nash equi-
librium computation can be done in polynomial time. Recall the best response polytopes P and Q
(3) for the bilinear game (A, B).
Lemma 6. Given a game (A, B), there exists a vertex pair ((y, p), (x, q)) ∈ P× Q such that (x, y) is a NE
of (A, B).
Proof. All the solutions of (4) over P × Q are the NE of the game, and existence of a solution is
guaranteed (Proposition 1). Suppose v ∈ P× Q is a NE of (A, B). It is easy to check that the entire
face, formed by the set of tight equations at v, is solution, and it contains at least one vertex, as P×Q
is bounded from one side. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Let k1 = k2 = k and rank(A) = l. The polytope P has at most O(N
l+k) vertices.
Proof. From (3), it is clear that P is in (N + k)-dimensional Euclidean space, however Fy = f gives
k linearly independent equalities. Therefore, P is of dimension N, and at a vertex of P, N linearly
independent inequalities must be tight. Since A is of rank l, rank([A -E]) ≤ l + k. Therefore, ∃!S ⊂
S1, |S| = l + k such that ∀i ∈ S1 \ S, Aiy− p
TEi ≤ 0 are not needed in defining the polytope P. At
a vertex, if d inequalities are tight from S then rest N − d must be of type yj = 0, hence for a fixed
D ⊂ S, |D| = d, there are at most ( NN−d) = (
N
d ) choices to form a vertex. Therefore, the total number
of vertices are at most ∑l+ki=0 (
l+k
i )(
N
i ) ≤ 2
l+kNl+k. ⊓⊔
Note that if we remove the assumption k1 = k2 = k then the exponent of N turns out to be a
linear function of l, k1 and k2. A similar proof can be worked out for Q.
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Theorem 4. If rank of either A or B is constant then a Nash equilibrium of a bilinear game (A, B) can be
computed in polynomial time, assuming k to be a constant.
Proof. Suppose rank(A) = l (a constant) and v = (y, p) ∈ P be a vertex. We can check in polynomial
time whether v corresponds to a NE or not as follows. Let Sx = {i ∈ S1 | Aiy − p
TEi = 0} and
Sy = {j ∈ S2 | yj > 0}. Consider all (x, q) ∈ R
M+k such that
Ex = e;
∀j ∈ Sy, xTBj − qTFj = 0; ∀i ∈ Sx, xi ≥ 0
∀j /∈ Sy, xTBj − qTFj ≤ 0; ∀i /∈ Sx, xi = 0.
Every such (x, q) lies in Q and makes a fully-labeled pair with v, and hence forms a NE (Lemma 1).
Note that such an (x, q) can be obtained in polynomial time by solving an LP. Now the proof follows
from Lemmas 6 and 7. A similar argument proves the other case when rank(B) is constant. ⊓⊔
As the set of bimatrix games is a subclass of the bilinear games (Example 1), where k1 = k2 = 1,
Theorem 4 strengthens the results by Lipton, Markakis and Mehta [22] (Corollary 4), and Kannan
and Theobald [17] (Theorem 3.2), where they require that the rank of both A and B to be constants.
Note that k in Bayesian games depends on the number of types of players and in the sequence form,
it depends on the number of information sets of players. Therefore, this result can be applied to
these games if in their bilinear representation, a payoff matrix has low rank and k is constant.
In fact Theorem 4 gives a polynomial time algorithm to enumerate all the extreme equilibria of a
bilinear game with a constant rank matrix, and an exponential time enumeration algorithm for any
bilinear game. A similar (exponential time) algorithm was given by Avis et al. [2] to enumerate all
Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game.
6 Conclusion
We have defined two-player bilinear games, where payoffs are represented by two matrices (A, B)
and strategy sets are compact polytopes. In both bilinear and bimatrix games, the utilities are bi-
linear functions of strategy vectors. The scope of these games is large enough to capture many in-
teresting classes of games like bimatrix games, two-player Bayesian games, polymatrix games, and
two-player extensive-form games with perfect recall. Considering the rank-based hierarchy puts
a structure on bilinear games, and by exploiting this structure and the similarity between bilin-
ear and bimatrix games, we extended various combinatorial and algorithmic results, pertaining to
the efficient computation of Nash equilibria, from bimatrix games to bilinear games. It will be in-
teresting to know what other results of bimatrix games extend to bilinear games like 1) designing
Lemke-Howson type algorithm for NE computation, 2) extending other algorithms for computation
of approximate equilibria, etc.
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